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ARTICLE

THE ISSUES OF E-MAIL PRIVACY AND
CYBERSPACE PERSONAL JURISDICTION: WHAT

CLIENTS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT TWO
PRACTICAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
REGARDING THE INTERNET
Mark S. Kende*

INTRODUCTION
Cyberspace seems to reach everywhere. On a macro-level, a
Canadian company could risk being subject to Montana court
jurisdiction based on the company's Web site being accessible to
Montanans.'
On a micro-level, an employee's privacy is
vulnerable when her company knows the contents of e-mails
sent from and received at her work computer.
2
Many law review articles have been written on these topics.
*
Associate Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law. B.A. Yale
University. J.D. University of Chicago Law School. Special thanks to Diana Copeland
and Chase Rosario for their assistance with the research, and to Mike Begley for his
diligent editing.
1.See Bedrejo v. Triple E Canada, Ltd., 1999 MT 200, 295 Mont. 430, 984 P.2d 739 (court
examines whether the Canadian manufacturer of an allegedly defective motor home can
be subject to jurisdiction in Montana based in part on the company's Web site).
2.For a list of cyberspace personal jurisdiction articles, see Joseph S. Burns & Richard A.
Bales, Personal Jurisdiction and the Web, 53 ME. L. REV. 29, 31 n.3 (2001). A list of
cyberspace personal jurisdiction cases can be found in Richard E. Kaye, Annotation,
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Few
combine
a theoretical
analysis
with
practical
recommendations regarding what attorneys should advise
clients to avoid liability. Moreover, there's been little written for
the Montana practitioner.3 This article's purpose is to fill the
scholarly gaps regarding these two distinct cyberspace law
topics.
Part I analyzes the constitutionality of employer e-mail
monitoring. This section recommends Montana employers take
specific precautions before monitoring because the Montana
Constitution's right to privacy, and to dignity, make such
activity suspect. 4 This section also briefly examines monitoring
under the U.S. Constitution's Fourth Amendment and federal
privacy statutes.
Part II examines personal jurisdiction in cyberspace,
focusing on decisions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit and the Montana Supreme Court. This section
assesses the popular "sliding scale" approach, which holds that
non-resident Web site owners should only be subject to
jurisdiction if their site is sufficiently interactive with the forum
state.5 This section also examines the "effects test," which
centers on the impact of a defendant's actions. 6 The section
concludes by providing specific recommendations on how clients
can reduce the liability risks of having a Web site.

Internet Web Site Activities of Nonresident Person or Corporationas ConferringPersonal
Jurisdiction Under Long-Arm Statutes and Due Process Clause, 81 A.L.R 5th 41 (2000).
One of the earliest articles on e-mail monitoring is by Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, An Affront
to Human Dignity: Electronic Mail Monitoring in the Private Sector Workplace, 8 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 345 (1995).
3. One of the few sources is Privacy in Cyberspace: Transcripts from the 1999
Judge James R. Browning Symposium, 61 MONT. L. REV. 43 (2000).
4. The privacy provision is in Article II, Section 10, of the Montana Constitution
and the dignity clause is in Article II, Section 4.
5. The source of the sliding scale approach is Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin,
952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (holding Pennsylvania has jurisdiction over
California Internet news provider because of defendant's contracts with 7 Pennsylvania
Internet service providers and with 3000 Pennsylvania residents). Zippo is one of the
most frequently cited cyberspace cases. See, e.g., Roy N. Dreben & Johanna Werbach,
Top 10 Things to Consider in Developing an Electronic Commerce Web Site, COMPUTER
LAW., May 1999 at 19 (stating that Internet jurisdiction law is supposedly "coalescing"
around the "seminal" Zippo case).
6. The "effects test" was born in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), where the
Supreme Court ruled a defendant who committed an intentional tort (defamation),
whose primary damaging effect would be felt by the plaintiff in a particular state, would
presumably be subject to personal jurisdiction there.
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES REGARDING E-MAIL
MONITORING
In May 2001, Judge Alex Kozinski and other Ninth Circuit
judges became upset when they discovered the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) in Washington D.C. could monitor
computer usage, including electronic mail, in their judicial
chambers. 7 The judges, feeling their privacy rights were being
violated, instructed Ninth Circuit computer staff to disconnect
the AO's monitoring capacity.8
AO officials claimed this
instruction made the Ninth Circuit computers vulnerable to
hackers. AO Director Leonidas Ralph Mecham even contended
Judge Kozinski was "advocating his passionate views that
judges are free, undetected, to download pornography and
Napster music on government computers in federal court
buildings on government time even though some of the
downloading may constitute felonies." 9 Since then, the AO's
monitoring capacity has apparently been reinstalled but with
some limitations. 10
The existence of a right to privacy under the U.S.
Constitution was advocated in a famous Harvard Law Review
article by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren at the end of the
12
They defined it as the "right to be left alone."
19th Century."
Even then, the authors expressed concern about new
technologies such as "instantaneous photographs" and
"numerous mechanical devices."1 3
Today's sophisticated
technologies make "spying" kid's play, particularly in an area
such as workplace e-mail. The New York Times in July 2001
reported:
a study released in the spring by the American Management
Association, a New York-based management development and
training non-profit, [which] concluded that more than threequarters of major U.S. firms now spot-check their employees'
phone calls, e-mails, Internet activities and computer files. The
7. Neil A. Lewis, Plan for Web Monitoringin Courts Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
2001, Late-Edition, § 1, at 34.
8.
Neil A. Lewis, Rebels in Black Robes Recoil at Surveillance of Computers, N.Y.
TIMES, August 8, 2001, at Al.
9. Lewis, supra note 7 (quoting Mecham, internal quotation marks omitted).
10. Tony Mauro, Judicial Conference Approves Monitoring of Judges' Internet Use,
AMERICAN LAWYER MEDIA, Sept. 20, 2001, availableat http://www.law.com.
11.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
12. Id. at 195 (citing COOLEY ON TORTS (2d. ed.) at 29).
13. Id. at 195.
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figure has doubled since 1997, driven principally by employer
concerns about liability for workplace harassment ....14

This section of the article addresses whether employers are
limited by constitutional or other restraints in monitoring
employee e-mail. The first part discusses U.S. Supreme Court
cases. The second part surveys case law and scholarship outside
of Montana. Finally, I'll describe what Montana's constitution
and case law say in relation to monitoring employee e-mail. My
conclusion is, although most jurisdictions have upheld employer
monitoring rights, such monitoring is suspect in Montana given
the State Constitution's strong privacy and dignity provisions.
A. U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
The U.S. Supreme Court's only cyberspace foray occurred in
a free speech case, Reno v. ACLU.15 The Court has yet to hear a
cyberspace privacy case. The Court, however, has recently dealt
with privacy issues involving new technologies, which provides
some initial guidance.
Last term, in Kyllo v. U.S.,16 the Court ruled police use of
thermal imaging technology from outside a home constituted a
Fourth Amendment search, meaning probable cause and
warrant requirements had to be satisfied. Justice Scalia wrote,
"It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured
to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely
unaffected by the advance of technology .... The question we
confront today is what limits there are upon this power of
technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy." 7 Two
factors weighing heavily in Scalia's decision were the
technology's unavailability to the public, and the sanctity of the
8
home.'
Also last term, in Bartnicki v. Vopper,' 9 the Court ruled the
First Amendment precludes a newspaper from prosecution
under the Federal Wiretap Act for publishing cellular phone
14.

Carl S. Kaplan, Reconsidering the Privacy of Office Computers, CYBER LAW

JOURNAL, July 27, 2001 at

http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/27/technology/27CYBERLAW. html.
15. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
16. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
17. Kyllo. at 33-34.
18. This pro-defendant ruling from a generally conservative U.S. Supreme Court
surprised many experts and amounted to an implicit vindication of the Montana
Supreme Court's ruling several years earlier in State v. Siegal, 281 Mont. 250, 934 P.2d
176 (1997).
19. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
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conversation transcripts on matters of public importance if
obtained illegally by a third party. In dissent, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote:
Technology now permits millions of important and confidential
conversations to occur through a vast system of electronic
networks. These advances, however, raise significant privacy
concerns. We are placed in the uncomfortable position of not
knowing who might have access to our personal and business emails, our medical and financial records, or our cordless and
cellular telephone conversations: (sic).... But the Court's decision

diminishes, rather than enhances, the purposes of the First
Amendment: chilling the speech of the millions of Americans
who
20
rely upon electronic technology to communicate each day.
Another case relevant to the e-mail issue is O'Connor v.
Ortega,21 where the Court held workers have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets
but the expectation may be reduced by the "operational realities
22
of the workplace."
The above U.S. Supreme Court cases involved alleged
governmental intrusions on privacy. Constitutional protections,
however, generally don't apply to private actors. Thus, one of
the many questions to be discussed here is what privacy rights
or additional constitutional guarantees do private employees
retain in their work e-mail. Except perhaps in Montana, most
private employees have little legal recourse.
B. Results Outside of Montana
Most courts have ruled employers can monitor worker email and computers. This section initially examines relevant
federal law and then looks at decisions from courts in other
states. These authorities need to be discussed first to provide
perspective on the later Montana analysis.
1. FederalLaw
a. The FederalConstitution
The U.S. Constitution so far has not generally prevented
government e-mail monitoring. For example, in United States v.

20.

Id. at 541-42 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

21.

480 U.S. 709 (1987).

22.

O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 717.
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Simons, 23 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled
the CIA's remote warrantless search of an employee's office
24
computer hard drive did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
The Court reasoned the employee knew monitoring was
permitted. 25 Moreover, the CIA possessed substantial evidence
indicating the employee used his office Internet connection to
26
traffic in child pornography.
b. FederalStatutes
The Federal Wiretap Act, 27 as amended by the Electronic
Communications
Privacy
Act
(ECPA),
prohibits
the
28
unauthorized "interception" of "electronic communications."
Most courts say interception requires a party to obtain a record
of the communication while it's being transmitted. 29 Similarly,
the Act has
historically
authorized
contemporaneous
interception of phone conversations.
Thus, under this
traditional interpretation, in most jurisdictions it is legal for an
employer to search an employee's hard drive for saved e-mail
30
messages because no transmission is occurring.
In Konop v. HawaiianAirlines, 31 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit rejected this narrow approach. Though the
Ninth Circuit ultimately withdrew the Konop opinion, it's worth
looking at because it shows that even a liberal interpretation of
ECPA's provisions provides only limited privacy protection to
employees. In Konop, an airline pilot had a secure Web site that
criticized his employer. 32
Airline
company officials
surreptitiously accessed the site by persuading other pilots to
give them their passwords. 33 The Ninth Circuit stated the Web
site owner could pursue a Wiretap Act claim based on the
company's unauthorized downloading of information, even
23. 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000). See also United States v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670
(5th Cir. 2002).
24. Simons, 206 F.3d at 398.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 401.
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2001).
28. Id. at § 2511.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1976).
30. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th
Cir. 1994).
31. 236 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion withdrawn, 262 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2001)
(the court indicates that "A subsequent opinion will be filed at a later date.") Id.
32. 236 F.3d at 1041. (The site attacked the labor policies of the airline).
33. Id.
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though the downloading was not contemporaneous with any
transmission. 34 The court explained:
It would be equally senseless to hold that Konop's messages to his
fellow pilots would have been protected from interception had he
recorded them and delivered them through a secure voice bulletin
board accessible by telephone, but not when he set them down in
electronic text and delivered them through a secure web server
accessible by a personal computer. We hold that the Wiretap Act
protects electronic communications from interception when stored
35
to the same extent as when in transit.

It seems, however, that Konop's reasoning doesn't preclude
employer e-mail monitoring because Konop involved illegal
intrusions into the employee's secure personal Web site whereas
employers generally own and control the computers and e-mail
systems their employees use at work. Indeed, the 1986 ECPA
provides an exception for employers. 36
The Stored
Communication Act also doesn't protect most employees from
monitoring because it prohibits unauthorized "access" to "a
facility through which an electronic communication service is
provided." 37 This is geared towards hacking, not monitoring.
In Bohach v. City of Reno, 3s a federal district court rejected
police officer claims the department violated their privacy rights
under the ECPA by accessing messages on their electronic
pagers. The Court found the officers knew pager messages were
placed on a department network open to those with access. 39
The Court also ruled the department qualified as a "service
provider" under the ECPA and thus could access the stored
40
messages.
In 1994, Congressman Pat Williams of Montana introduced
legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives designed to
34. Id. at 1044. At least one commentator has advocated such an approach.
Tatsuya Akamine, Proposalfor a FairStatutory Interpretation:Email Stored in a Service
Provider Computer is Subject to an Interception Under the Wiretap Act, 7 J.L. & POLY
519, 527-28 (1999).
35. Konop, at 1046.
36.

ELLEN ALDERMEN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT To PRIVACY 315 (1995).

See also Erik J. Belanoff et. al., E-Mail: Property Rights v. Privacy Rights in the
Workplace, 45 PRAC. LAW., Dec. 1999, at 33. ("Accessing someone else's mailbox and
reading their stored e-mail messages does not constitute an interception for purposes of
a criminal violation of section 2511.").

37.
38.

18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1) (2002).
932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996).

39. Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1233.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (2002). This statute also has an exception which makes
it legal to inspect e-mails if the "conduct [is] authorized by a user of that service with
respect to a communication of or intended for that user.. . ." See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2).
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protect worker privacy. However, the legislation never passed. 41
Since existing federal statutes don't protect employees from email monitoring, it's necessary to see what the case law says
regarding privacy issues in cyberspace.
2. Case Law Outside Montana
In Smyth v. Pillsbury Company,42 a federal district court
ruled Pillsbury did not wrongfully discharge Smyth when it fired
him because of his unprofessional e-mail statements. 43 Smyth
alleged a tortious invasion of privacy.4 4 Indeed, Pillsbury had
promised employees that all e-mail communications were
confidential and unmonitored, and that no employee could be
45
terminated based on e-mail comments.
Nonetheless, in ruling for Pillsbury, the Court noted:
Unlike urinalysis and personal property searches, we do not find a
reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail communications
voluntarily made by an employee to his supervisor over the
company e-mail system notwithstanding any assurances that such
communications would not be intercepted by management.
Once plaintiff communicated the alleged unprofessional comments
to a second person (his supervisor) over an e-mail system which
was apparently utilized by the entire company, any reasonable
expectation of privacy was lost... [Moreover] we do not find that a
reasonable person would consider the defendant's interception of
these communications 46to be a substantial and highly offensive
invasion of his privacy.

Smyth's reasoning has several weaknesses. One author
argues the decision confused Smyth's legitimate expectation of
e-mail privacy, fostered by his supervisor's statements, with the
47
fact he admittedly did not work or communicate in solitude.
The author also suggests the decision conflicts with the U.S.
Supreme Court's Ortega case, which recognized employees have
41.

See H.R. 1900, 103d Cong., To

PREVENT ABUSES OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING

IN THE WORKPLACE (1993).

42. 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
43. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 99. Smyth apparently said in frustration that he'd like
to kill some members of the sales force, and that a company party would be like a Jim
Jones Koolaid event. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF
PRIVACY IN AMERICA 74 (2000).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101.
47. Rod Dixon, Windows Nine-To-Five: Smyth v. Pillsbury and the Scope of an
Employee's Right of Privacy in Employer Communications, 2 VA. J. L. & TECH. 4, 22
(1997).
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reasonable privacy expectations in the workplace. 48 The author
further explains, "Paradoxically, the privacy protection afforded
postal mail and voice-mail far outstrips that currently afforded
e-mail.
Moreover, unlike postal mail, e-mail reaches its
intended recipient almost instantaneously and may be more
secure than postal mail by adopting encryption technology."4 9 In
addition, Professor Jeffrey Rosen argues the Court was wrong in
assuming the privacy intrusion was not substantial or highly
offensive, particularly given how easily outsiders can
misinterpret the meaning of private e-mails. 50
Nonetheless, Smyth has been followed. In McLaren v.
Microsoft Corp.,51 a Texas court of appeals rejected Bill
McLaren's claim that Microsoft's examination of e-mail stored
on his office computer's "personal folders" invaded his privacy.
The court rejected McLaren's argument that his computer is
similar to an employee work locker. 52 The Court reasoned the
work locker is entitled to more privacy because it's intended for
53
personal belongings, whereas the computer is for work.
Further, the locker is more private because
"any e-mail
messages stored in McLaren's personal folders were first
transmitted over the network and were at some point accessible
by a third party."54 McLaren's use of a private password did not
change the court's view. 55 Finally, Microsoft was inspecting the
computer because of serious sexual harassment accusations
56
against McLaren, which could expose the company to liability.
Thus, the company's interest in preventing illegal activity
57
outweighed McLaren's privacy interest.
An unreported California decision, Shoars v. Epson
America, likewise rejected a privacy violation claim by an
employee whose e-mail was examined. The trial court declared
the e-mail messages to be mainly business related and "with few
exceptions," California's state constitutional right to privacy
covered only "personal information ... no sufficient legal or

48.
49.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 31.

50.

ROSEN, supra note 43, at 75.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

No. 97-00095-F, 1999 WL 339015 (Tex. App. May 28, 1999).
McLaren, 1999 WL 339015, at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
McLaren, 1999 WL 339015, at *5.
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factual basis [existed] for extending the right to privacy to cover
business-oriented communications."5 8 Numerous other courts
59
have discussed the limited privacy rights of employees.
In contrast, the Superior Court of Massachusetts has
questioned employer e-mail monitoring. In Restuccia v. Burk
Technology,60 a supervisor learned two of his employees had
been wasting time on their computers at work. 61 These same
62
employees also authored e-mails critical of their supervisor.
The supervisor discharged the employees. 63
In a rather
conclusory decision, the Court decided the plaintiffs' tort claims
for invasion of privacy should survive summary judgment
because there were genuine issues of material fact as to
"whether plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their E-Mail messages and whether Burk's reading of the E-Mail
messages constituted an unreasonable, substantial, or serious
interference with plaintiffs' privacy."6
Perhaps the most noteworthy defense of an employee's right
to privacy in the e-mail context comes from a short law journal
article published by U.S. District Judge James Rosenbaum, of
Minneapolis. 65 Judge Rosenbaum acknowledges the common
assumption employees lack such a right because the computer is
the employer's property.
However, Judge Rosenbaum then
describes this country's long tradition of honoring privacy rights,
going back to the founding fathers, and says:
An employee unquestionably owes a duty to perform services on
the employer's behalf during the work day .... But do the
employee's idle acts permit the employer to more, beyond proof of
the employee's breach of duty? After establishing its right to

58.

ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, IN OUR DEFENSE: THE BILL OF

RIGHTS IN ACTION 315 (1998).

59. Medical Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1208-09 (D.
Ariz. 1998); Ali v. Douglas Cable Communications, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1378-80 (D. Kan.
1996); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d
1269, 1281 (Nev. 1995); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563 (Utah 1988).
60. 1996 WL 1329386 (Mass. Supp. 1996).
61. Id. at*1.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Restuccia, 1996 WL 1329386 at *3.Two other cases asserting employees have
limited privacy rights in their workplace e-mail, until it's received by someone else, are
United States v. Charbonneau,979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997) and United
States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418 (C.A.A.F. 1996). One of the few cases to take a proemployee perspective in the workplace privacy debate, but not involving e-mail
monitoring, is Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983).
65. The piece's significance was shown by an article about it in the New York
Times. Kaplan, supra note 14.
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reimbursement, recompense, or even termination, the employer's
right to wander through
the employee's personal material does not
66
seem self-evident.

He proposes that employers who wish to search an employee's
computer or e-mail provide advance notice and other procedural
protections to the employee. 67 Thus, even Judge Rosenbaum
concedes the employer's authority to monitor, albeit with some
limitations.
C. The Montana Constitution
This section looks at how the Montana Supreme Court
might treat the e-mail monitoring issue under the Montana
Constitution. Additionally, this section discusses how employers
can prevent liability. To date, no Montana case has specifically
addressed the e-mail question.
The Montana Constitution's privacy provision68 and dignity
provision 69 would likely make the analysis of e-mail monitoring
different here than nationally. I will deal with each separately
as well as with the scrutiny analysis that might result.
1. Privacy
Montana's privacy provision states, "The right of individual
privacy is essential to the well being of a free society and shall
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state
interest."70
This privacy right has been interpreted more
broadly in Montana than at the federal level. This makes sense
as there is no explicit right to privacy in the U.S. Constitution.
The U.S. Supreme Court had to find an implied right to privacy

66. James M. Rosenbaum, In Defense of the Hard Drive, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 169, 170
(2001). See also James M. Rosenbaum, In Defense of the DELETE Key, 3 GREEN BAG 2d
393 (2000).
67. Other articles raising concerns about employer e-mail monitoring include:
Amanda Richman, Note, Restoring the Balance: Employer Liability and Employee
Privacy, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1337 (2001); Carey C. Hooper, Comment, You've Got Mail:

Privacy Rights in the Workplace, 25 S.ILL. U. L.J. 609 (2001); Lawrence E. Rothstein,
Privacy or Dignity?: Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 379 (2000); Dan McIntosh, e-Monitoring @ workplace.com: The Future of
Communication Privacy in the Minnesota Private-SectorWorkplace, 23 HAMLINE L. REV.
539 (2000); Larry 0. Gantt, An Affront to Human Dignity: Electronic Mail Monitoring in
the Private Sector Workplace, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 345 (1995); Dixon, supra note 47.

68.
69.
70.

MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
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72
7
in decisions like Griswold v. Connecticut ' and Roe v. Wade.
Moreover, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, Montana's Supreme
73
Court has ruled in favor of the privacy rights of homosexuals.
Additionally, Montana's Supreme Court supports abortion rights
more strongly than the U.S. Supreme Court's most recent
74
pronouncement in the area.
It is also worth noting that Montana's privacy provision
appears to cover non-governmental conduct, unlike most federal
constitutional rights. However, there has not been much case
law articulating how vigorously the Montana courts will apply
75
the constitutional protections to private entities.
The seminal case for the e-mail issue is State v. Siegal.76 In
Siegal, the Montana Supreme Court held police use of thermal
imaging technology was a search, in large part because such
77
technology infringed the right to privacy of those in the home.
The Court said the average Montanan would find it shocking to
learn the government could secretly monitor homes for heat
78
signatures without consent or a warrant.
The Court explained further that the 1972 Montana
Constitutional Convention adopted the privacy provision out of
grave concerns about how "computerized data banks" and other
modern technologies (such as wiretaps) could collect information
about people without their knowledge. 79 The Court noted the
problem was not only government, but also private actors with
such capacities.8 0 The Court therefore concluded the framers

71. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
72. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
73. Gryczan v. State, 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112 (1997).
74. Compare Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, 296 Mont. 361, 989 P.2d 364
(1999), with Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
75. Alaska has a constitutional provision which expressly seems to guarantee
privacy even from private party intrusions, yet the Alaska courts have limited the
provision to governmental actions. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d
1123 (Alaska 1989). Montana, however, has already made clear in court decisions that
its constitutional provisions outlaw private violations in many contexts, such as
regarding environmental degradations. See Cape-France Enters. v. Estate of Peed,
2001 MT 139, 305 Mont. 513, 29 P.3d 1011; Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Department of
Envtl. Quality, 1999 MT 248, 296 Mont. 207, 988 P.2d 1236. An excellent argument for
finding that privacy rights should apply to private employees can be found in McIntosh,
supra note 67, at 572.
76. 281 Mont. 250, 275, 934 P.2d 176, 190 (1997).
77. 281 Mont. at 262-63, 934 P.2d at 183.
78. Siegal, 281 Mont. at 274, 934 P.2d at 190.
79. Id. at 274, 934 P.2d at 191.
80. Siegal, at 278, 934 P.2d at 191-192. This history shows the argument for
applying the Montana privacy provision to non-governmental actors is therefore even
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would have found thermal imaging technology to be a privacy
8
violation. '
The argument that unannounced e-mail monitoring violates
privacy seems even stronger than for thermal imaging.
Montana's framer's were expressly concerned with computerized
data base intrusion back in 1972 and that's what's involved
when an employer sneaks into their employee's e-mail records.
This argument finds support in a speech given at the
Montana Law Review's 1999 Judge James R. Browning
Cyberspace Symposium by Nancy Sinclair, a Montana attorney
who represents employers on Internet and e-mail issues. As
part of a panel on "Privacy in Cyberspace," Ms. Sinclair stated:
Many companies [and] firms... [now] have access.. .to e-mail from
outside sources. A frequently asked question is, can I read an
employee's e-mail? Nationally, there is a trend towards saying, in
the private sector, there is no expectation of privacy in e-mail
received on an employer's computer.. .The thing about Montana
is, as Professor Elison discussed, we have a heightened
constitutional privacy provision. I believe that the Montana
Supreme Court could easily find that employees do have an

expectation of privacy in their e-mail, especially in light of the fact
that many companies don't have any policies even addressing this
82
issue.

Moreover, a Practical Lawyer article on worker privacy
specifically references Montana as a state "where an employee's
right to privacy is heightened" given the specific protections
83
found in the Montana Constitution.
In response, employers can point to the Montana statute
stating any property the employee acquires by virtue of his
employment (except salary or other compensation) remains the
employer's belonging, and presumably this would include a
computer that the employee is using for personal e-mail

stronger than for applying some other Montana constitutional provisions.
It is
worthwhile to recall that in 1972, there was substantial evidence indicating the FBI and
other government agents had engaged in illegal wiretapping, eavesdropping, and other
activities targeted at certain political groups, such as those actively opposing the
Vietnam War or supporting the civil rights movement. And as the Watergate scandal
showed, even the Republican Party, technically a private entity, used such illicit tactics.
This was the historical backdrop when the Montana delegates met and it explains their
concerns with such technologies and privacy issues.
81. Id. at 278, 934 P.2d at 192.
82. Privacy in Cyberspace: Transcripts from the 1999 Judge James R. Browning
Symposium, 61 MONT. L. REv. 43, 64 (2000).
83. Erik J. Belanoff, Evan J. Spelfogel & Maureen K. Bogue, E-Mail: Property
Rights vs. Privacy Rights in the Workplace, PRACTICAL LAWYER, Dec., 1999, at 29, 38.
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messages.8 4 However, if the U.S. Supreme Court in Ortega
found employees have privacy rights in their desk drawer
contents, it seems the Montana Supreme Court would find even
greater privacy rights in the e-mail situation, especially where
employees have individual unpublicized passwords.
Montana has two other relevant electronic statutes, yet
neither seem to undermine this constitutional analysis. One
provision protects the privacy of electronic communications,
though its major focus appears to be the purposeful
unauthorized interception of data in the process of being
transmitted.8 5 In addition, Montana has an anti-hacking statute
86
forbidding the unlawful use of a computer.
A broader counter-argument is all employees should know
e-mail is not guaranteed to remain confidential. The Monica
Lewinsky scandal made this obvious.8 7 Thus, employees can
have no subjective expectation of privacy, nor any objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy.8 8 Even the e-mail's recipient
could forward the e-mail on to others.8 9 But this was essentially
the argument made in Smyth, which was effectively dismantled
by the critics who showed that it confused an expectation of
privacy with a lack of solitude; that it paradoxically gave phone
conversations more protection than e-mail; and that it ignored
the true degradation involved when an employee has been
monitored without knowledge. These criticisms are particularly
persuasive in a jurisdiction like Montana with such strong

84. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-102 (2001).
85. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (2001).
86. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-311 (2001).
87. See ROSEN, supra note 43, at 54 (Professor Jeffrey Rosen discusses this at
length). Another critique of the position that Montana employees have special e-mail
privacy rights is that the federal ECPA preempts state constitutional provisions and
occupies the field. There are several problems with this argument. First, a decision
from a Ninth Circuit court has already rejected this kind of preemption argument. In
Roberts v. Americable Intern. Inc., the Court stated, "Of course, federal law will not
control in state court in the face of a state statute governing the tape recording of private
conversations when that state law is stricter than the federal law." Id., 883 F. Supp.
499, 503 n.6 (E.D. Cal. 1995). Second, it does not appear ECPA was intended to occupy
the field and eliminate state created privacy rights.
88. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Katz approach is particularly
tempting to use here as the case involved the modern technology question of whether the
government engaged in a search by wiretapping a public telephone. The Siegal case
relied in part on this Katz analysis too.
89. Professor Rosen's book discusses how a "journalist" viewed a forwarded copy of
an e-mail Professor Lawrence Lessig sent to a friend and somehow interpreted the email erroneously to suggest Lessig was making a sexual proposition. See ROSEN, supra
note 43, at 75-76.
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privacy protection.
2. Dignity
Hypothetically, let's assume an employee who sends e-mail
over the company network is viewed as having waived any
privacy claim regarding the message. Nonetheless, in Montana,
unannounced employer monitoring would still probably violate
the Constitution's dignity clause, which states in Article II,
Section 4, "The dignity of the human being is inviolable."
The dignity clause of the Montana Constitution has been
underutilized. In the abortion area, the Montana Supreme
Court made one of its rare pronouncements about the clause in
dicta:
Respect for the dignity of each individual - a fundamental right
protected by Article II Section 4 of the Montana Constitution demands that people have for themselves the moral right and
moral responsibility to confront the most fundamental questions
about the meaning and value of their own lives and the intrinsic
value of life in general, answering to their own consciences and
90
convictions.

The central concern is with the arbitrary "denigration and
condemnation" of individuals. 9 1
It's hard to imagine a greater indignity or degradation than
having your personal e-mail read by a supervisor, especially if
you have no idea your employer is engaged in this activity. A
recent article in the Montana Law Review by Professor Tom
Huff and Mathew Clifford suggests the dignity clause should be
viewed as covering certain matters that are basic affronts to
humanity and yet which other constitutional provisions don't
protect. 92 Thus, even if the privacy argument is waived, the
Huff/Clifford article reveals a violation of dignity would
certainly be a powerful claim. Moreover, an older Montana law
review article makes a powerful argument for applying the
90.

Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261,

72, 296 Mont. 361,

72, 989 P.2d 364,

72.
91. Id. 73.
92. Mathew Clifford & Tom Huff, Some Thoughts on the Meaning and Scope of the
Montana Constitution'sDignity Clause with Possible Applications, 61 MONT. L. REV. 301
(2000). This article also says that a significant personal degradation must occur to
violate the dignity clause. Yet employers may argue that snooping on e-mails that only
deal with topics such as what groceries to get for dinner would not suffice. This view,
however, is shortsighted because it's simply a happy coincidence for the employee in a
certain situation that the uninteresting topic of groceries is involved. Next time, the
snooping may reveal very intimate advice the employee's giving to his daughter via email.
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dignity clause to private violations. 93 Additionally, there is an
interesting law review article, which draws on European legal
sources to argue unannounced workplace e-mail monitoring
94
injures the worker's dignity in fundamental ways.
3. Strict Scrutiny
Assuming unannounced workplace e-mail monitoring
invades an employee's privacy and dignity rights, the question
becomes whether the employer can show its policies are
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling interest.
The
Montana Supreme Court has followed this approach to strict
scrutiny in cases like Siegal. Two situations might justify
surveillance activities of an employer.
First, if the employer has strong evidence that the employee
is carrying out a criminal enterprise via e-mail, this would
qualify as a compelling interest. Second, if the employer has
strong evidence the employee is electronically committing
sexual, racial, or other harassment, this activity would likewise
justify monitoring. Courts should conclude employers have
compelling interests in at least some of these cases so employers
aren't in the Catch 22 of being subject to liability if they don't
act vigorously to prevent harassment or a crime. An Iowa Law
Review article 95 concentrates on the harassment portion of the e93. Tia Rikel Robbin, Untouched Protectionfrom Discrimination:Private Action in
Montana's Individual Dignity Clause, 51 MONT. L. REV. 553 (1989). See also Gantt,
supra note 2.
94. Lawrence E. Rothstein, Privacy or Dignity?: Electronic Monitoring in the
Workplace,19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 379 (2000) (showing how France, Italy,
and Europe generally protect electronic privacy in the workplace more comprehensively
than the U.S. does in part based on their notions of dignity).
95. Amanda Richman, Note, Restoring the Balance: Employer Liability and
Employee Privacy, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1337 (2001). This article also shows why the privacy
analysis should not generally vary depending on whether the employer is a government
agency or a private company. Non-government employers, however, could argue strict
scrutiny should not be applied to them. They are likely to argue for a balancing test.
They could assert that it does not make sense to discuss whether a private employer has
a compelling governmental interest. Moreover, non-government employees must make a
profit - the public interest is secondary. Lastly, Montana's Constitution even refers to
the right to earn a living.
But there are several problems with this reasoning. First the Constitutional
Convention delegates were very concerned about the dangers of non-governmental
intrusions. Second, in Cape-FranceEnters., the Montana Supreme Court recently used a
compelling interest test where the issue involved environmental degradation by a
private entity. Id., 2001 MT 139, I 31-32, 305 Mont. 513, IT 31-32, 29 P.3d 1011, 1%
31-32. Third, while the compelling interest test may not be suitable in all Montana cases
involving alleged private violations of fundamental rights, the entity disputing the test's
applicability should bear a heavy burden of proof to show why it's not suitable.
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mail monitoring problem as does much of Professor Rosen's
96
book, The Unwanted Gaze.
But even in situations where a criminal enterprise or
harassment is being investigated, the examination should be as
focused on the specific wrongdoing as possible, rather than be a
fishing expedition. 97 These employees still have some privacy
rights. 98 Employers should also consider Judge Rosenbaum's
recommendation that they give employees some advance notice
of an inspection in some instances.
4. Remedies and PreventativeMeasures
Except for the two limited scenarios mentioned above, email monitoring would seem to be unconstitutional in Montana
and should subject the employer to an injunction and
appropriate damages. So what should employers do to protect
themselves?
Employers should probably take two actions suggested by
Nancy Sinclair at the Montana Law Review cyberspace
symposium in 1999. First, employers should notify employees
that employee e-mail may be monitored, and that employee use
of e-mail for personal matters may be problematic. 99 Employees
who subsequently expose themselves in e-mails have then
knowingly waived their right to privacy. Second, employers
should try to have all employees sign user agreements,
regarding the computer, in which one provision authorizes
monitoring. 10 0
Through such careful preventative actions,
Employers cannot meet that burden, it would seem, regarding e-mail monitoring given
the strong privacy and dignity interests.
96. See supra note 43.
97. Id. at 179-182 (encouraging policy makers to limit electronic searches to
serious situations).
98. See Siegal, 281 Mont. at 263, 934 P.2d at 183 (stating Montana doesn't
necessarily have a compelling interest in enforcing routine criminal laws where
significant harms aren't at stake).
99. Privacy in Cyberspace: Transcripts from the 1999 Judge James R. Browning
Symposium, supra note 3, at 64-65.
100. Id. Restrictive e-mail monitoring and usage policies, however, are not a
panacea for employers. If not carefully drafted, these policies can also be challenged as
violating privacy and dignity rights. And if imposed on government employees, these
policies can violate free speech rights, particularly as applied to academics doing
research where the free speech interest deserves the highest protection. See e.g. Kate
Williams, Note, Loss of Academic Freedom on the Internet: The Fourth Circuit's Decision
in Urofsky v. Gilmore, 21 REV. LITIG. 493 (Spring 2002); Donald T. Weidner, Thoughts on
Academic Freedom and Beyond, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 257 (2001); Recent Cases, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 1414 (2001). But see Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1070 (2001).
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employers can prevent the nightmare of exposure to the types of
constitutional claims I have alluded to, and employees will be
fully informed.
One downside of this approach is some prospective
employees could either refuse to sign an agreement, or refuse to
work for an employer who complies with this advice. Given the
fact Montana employers can only discharge workers for cause,
there may also be issues about whether current employees can
be required to sign. After all, what would be the penalty? At a
minimum, employers should give employees adequate time and
opportunity to read and think about the user agreement. As the
above discussion shows, the issue of e-mail monitoring may well
pose some fascinating questions for the Montana Supreme
Court.
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN CYBERSPACE
An American Bar Association journal article jokingly stated
cyberspace personal jurisdiction law is based on the "Missouri
rules:" 1 1 the Missouri party always prevails. 10 2 This assessment
may be harsh given that one should expect the global and
ephemeral Internet to create problems for an area of law where
state sovereignty remains important. But this ABA article is
certainly correct that courts have not been consistent.
The first part of this section discusses the key U.S. Supreme
Court cases on personal jurisdiction. The next part examines
several Ninth Circuit decisions regarding personal jurisdiction
in cyberspace, with a special focus on the sliding scale test and
the effects test. The third part critically examines the Montana
Supreme Court's foray into this area.
Lastly, I provide
recommendations on how clients can limit liability.
A. The U.S. Supreme Court
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, there are two kinds of
personal jurisdiction: general and specific. 10 3
General

101. Robert W. Hamilton & Gregory A. Castanias, Tangled Web: Personal
Jurisdictionand the Internet, 24 LITIG. 27 (1998).
102. Compare Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997) (Missouri defendant not subject to jurisdiction)
with Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (Missouri court
had jurisdiction over California defendant in Web trademark case).
103. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-415
(1984).
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jurisdiction means the courts of a state can adjudicate any claim
brought against the defendant, regardless of the subject
matter. 10 4 A defendant must have "continuous and systematic"
contacts with the forum state to be subject to general
jurisdiction. 0 5 This requirement is difficult to meet. For
example, the U.S. Supreme Court found this test was not
satisfied in a case where a non-resident engaged in four million
dollars of business with a state.'0 6 According to the Court, part
of the problem was the defendant lacked a persistent physical
07
presence.
Specific jurisdiction exists where three requirements are
met. First, the defendant must have "minimum contacts" with
the forum state. 0 8 To put it another way, the defendant must
have "purpose*fully availed" itself of the chance to do business
there.'0 9 Second, the claim must arise out of, or relate to, the
defendant's contacts with the forum state. 1 0 Third, it must be
reasonable or fair to assert jurisdiction over the defendant."' To
determine reasonableness, courts should look at the burden on
the defendant, the forum state's interest, the plaintiffs interest,
"the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of
the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
2
policies."1
The Court has not always been clear about what these
requirements mean. In Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court,13 the Court divided on the level of foreseeability required
to constitute purposeful availment. Asahi involved the issue of
whether California courts had personal jurisdiction over a
Japanese company that was being sued by a Taiwanese tire tube
manufacturer because of an allegedly defective tube valve." 4 A

104. Id. at 414-415.
105. Id. at 415 (quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438
(1952)).
106. Id. at 411.
107. Id. at 418.
108. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).
109. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). See also InternationalShoe, 326
U.S. at 319.
110. Helicopteros,466 U.S. at 415.
111. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
112. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. See also Kulko v. Cal. S. Ct., 436
U.S. 84, 93, 98 (1978).
113. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
114. 480 U.S. at 105.
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California plaintiff had initiated the lawsuit but settled before
trial. 115 The Court ruled California lacked jurisdiction because
it would be unfair to force a foreign corporation to defend
against a foreign plaintiff in such circumstances. 116
Regarding purposeful availment, Justice Brennan reasoned
the Japanese company did enough business in California so that
it should reasonably have foreseen the possibility of being sued
in the state of California. 117 Justice O'Connor suggested,
however, additional actions were required for establishing
personal jurisdiction. Justice O'Connor opined the personal
jurisdiction threshold may have been met if there was evidence
indicating the Japanese company intended for its valves to end
up in California, rather than simply knowing the valves might
end up there."18 Her view has been called the "additional
conduct test."119 This disagreement over personal jurisdiction
has never been resolved and is significant for the cyberspace
120
issue.
The Supreme Court has also found jurisdiction to exist
under the "effects test" adopted in Calder v. Jones.121 In Calder,
the Court held California courts had jurisdiction over the
National Enquirer (based in Florida) for publishing a libelous
article about the actress Shirley Jones. 122 The Court reasoned
jurisdiction existed because the Enquirer should have known
that it would injure Ms. Jones in Hollywood circles. 123 National
distribution of the magazine did not eliminate purposeful
availment towards California.
B. The Ninth Circuit
As shown above, personal jurisdiction has centered on
whether the defendknt is sufficiently "present" within the forum
state. However, the ephemeral nature of cyberspace raises the

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106.
Id. at 108.
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 119.
Id. at 112.
Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 945 (4th Cir. 1994).
The lower courts are divided as between the approaches of Brennan and

O'Connor.

See RICHARD FREER & WENDY PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE 94 (2d ed. 1997).

Similarly, courts are divided over whether to take a broad or restrictive view of
jurisdiction over web sites.
121.
465 U.S. 783, 789-790 (1984).
122.
Calder,465 U.S. at 786.
123. Id. at 788.
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question: "Is There a There There?" 124 A Web site is both
everywhere and nowhere at the same time. Thus, the issue
remains: how should personal jurisdiction work in such a
situation? Several Ninth Circuit decisions have addressed this
question.
12 5
1. Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.

a. The Case
Cybersell involved a trademark infringement action brought
by an Arizona corporation, Cybersell, Inc., against a Florida
corporation that had initially adopted the same name. 126 Both
companies had Web sites. 127 Cybersell, Inc. filed suit in an
Arizona federal court. 28 The Arizona company was established
in 1994 to provide Internet advertising and marketing
services. 29 The company's founders were the first Web users to
"spam" the Internet.' 30 The Florida company was established in
the summer of 1995 and it advertised Web construction
services.' 31 The Florida company designed its Web site without
knowledge of the Arizona company. 132 The Florida company
133
sought declaratory relief as a defense.
The Ninth Circuit ruled the Florida company was not
subject to personal jurisdiction in Arizona. The Court initially
discussed two cases. In CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson,134 the
Sixth Circuit ruled Ohio had jurisdiction over a Texas defendant
who traded computer software via an Ohio Internet service
provider's network. In Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,135 a
New York federal district court found that New York lacked
jurisdiction over a Missouri defendant. The plaintiff owned a
124. Michael Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet
Jurisdiction,16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345 (2001).
125. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
126. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 415.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 415.
132. Id. (Perhaps because the Arizona company's site was down for reconstruction
after February of 1995).
133. Id. at 415-16.
134. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
135. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
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New York jazz club, the "Blue Note," and was suing the owner of
a Missouri club, also called the "Blue Note." The Court said the
defendant could not be sued in New York because, "Creating a
site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be
felt nationwide-or even worldwide-but, without more, it is not an
1 36
act purposefully directed to the forum state."
After discussing these approaches, the Ninth Circuit in
Cybersell adopted the "sliding scale" test used by the federal
district court in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.
Specifically, the Court in Cybersell stated, "In sum, the common
thread, well stated by the district court in Zippo, is that 'the
likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally
exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of
commercial activity that an entity conducts over the
Internet." 137 Zippo distinguished between Web sites where
business was being done in a state (jurisdiction presumptively
exists), interactive Web sites (less clear), and passive Web sites
138
(jurisdiction generally doesn't exist).
The Ninth Circuit elaborated by suggesting:
'Interactive' web sites present somewhat different issues. Unlike
passive sites... users can exchange information with the host
computer when the site is interactive. Courts that have addressed
interactive sites have looked to the 'level of interactivity and
commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on
the Web site' to determine 39if sufficient contacts exist to warrant
the exercise of jurisdiction.1

Applying the Zippo sliding scale, the Ninth Circuit ruled the
Florida company had an essentially passive Web page, did not
encourage Arizonans to use the site, did not aim its activities at
Arizonans, and apparently received no Arizona "hits" except
from the plaintiff.' 40 Moreover, the Florida company "entered
into no contracts in Arizona, made no sales in Arizona, received
no telephone calls from Arizona, earned no income from Arizona,
and sent no messages over the Internet to Arizona."' 4 ' The court
added Cybersell, FL did not have an 800 number and, "[tihe
interactivity of its web page is limited to receiving the browser's
name and address and an indication of interest-signing up for
136.
137.

Id. at 301.
Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 419 (quoting Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952

F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).

138.
139.
140.
141.

Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 419.
Id.
Id.
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the service is not an option...,142
The Ninth Circuit then asserted, "Cybersell FL has done no
act and has consummated no transaction, nor has it performed
any act by which it purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities, in Arizona, thereby invoking the benefits
and protections of Arizona law." 143 The Ninth Circuit further
concluded "so far as we are aware, no court has ever held that an
Internet advertisement alone is sufficient to subject the
advertiser to jurisdiction in the plaintiffs home state.'1 44 The
Court concluded the plaintiff failed to meet the first prong of the
specific jurisdiction
test
(minimum contacts/purposeful
availment) and if the Court were to rule differently, "every
complaint arising out of alleged trademark infringement on the
Internet would automatically result in personal jurisdiction
wherever the plaintiffs principal place of business is
located . . . . 145
The Ninth Circuit found that Calder's effects test was
inapplicable because the Florida defendant's Web page "simply
was not aimed intentionally at Arizona knowing that harm was
likely to be caused there to Cybersell AZ." 146 Moreover, the
Court reasoned the effects test could not be applied because
corporate defendants do not "suffer harm in a particular
geographic location in the same sense that an individual
does.' 1 47 Finally, the Ninth Circuit found Panavision Int'l v.
49
Toeppen 148 inapplicable.
Cybersell is an example of one of the many courts adopting
the Zippo sliding scale analysis. A commentator has suggested:

142. Id.
143. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 419.
144. Id. at 418. This statement is debatable given the case of Inset Sys., Inc. v.
Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). A brief discussion of this
controversial statement in Cybersell can be found in: Mark Kende, Lost in Cyberspace:
The Judiciary's Distracted Application of Free Speech and Personal Jurisdiction
Doctrines to the Internet, 77 OR. L. REV. 1125, 1166 n.231 (1998). One commentator has
suggested courts that adopt a very liberal approach to finding jurisdiction over Web sites
are using a "spider" approach (wherever the Web goes), whereas courts using a more
restrictive test are using a "highway" approach (requiring a more concrete connection).
Joseph S. Burns & Richard A. Bales, PersonalJurisdiction and the Web, 53 ME. L. REV.
29, 31 (2001). This is analogous to the Brennan/O'Connor division in Asahi Metal Indus.
v. Superior Court.
145. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 420.
146. Id.
147. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 420.
148. 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996), affd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
149. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 420.
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The most notable commonality among the Internet jurisdiction
cases is their use of precedent. Beginning in March 1997, only two
months after the Western District of Pennsylvania laid down the
Zippo opinion, every district court examining on-line contacts cited
to Zippo, even though CompuServe offered a valid circuit court
decision on the issue. District courts continued to cite to Zippo
throughout 1998 and 1999, despite the fact that by the end of
1999, six circuit court decisions from five different circuits had
issued relevant opinions. Highlighting this structural problem is
the fact that the districts did not cite Zippo as a mere example;
most relied almost exclusively on that case as the basis of their
analysis and by early 1998 only cited the circuit decisions
as mere
50
sample fact patterns to illustrate the logic of Zippo.1

b. Criticism
Professor Michael Geist, a leading Internet scholar, has
dissected the problems with the Zippo sliding scale approach.
These include the following:
1) Most Web sites fall into the middle category of being somewhat
interactive and Zippo provides little guidance on how to resolve
those cases.
2) A judicial determination that a site is highly interactive doesn't
look at the owner's forum state sales, and thus ignores the
purposeful availment requirement.
3) A court might characterize chat room postings as passive, yet
defamatory postings have subjected their authors to personal
jurisdiction.
4) Sites may not be what they seem. Apparently
passive sites
151
may use hidden data collection technologies.

Another problem is the willingness of courts using the
sliding scale approach to examine whether the site had lots of
hits in the state. Purposeful availment analysis should focus on
what the Web site owner intended, not on the fortuitous
circumstance of whether lots of hits in the state occurred.
2. PanavisionIntern., L.P. v. Toeppen

52

The next major Ninth Circuit case involved an appeal of the
150. Christine G. Heslinga, Note, The Founders Go On-Line: An Original Intent
Solution to a JurisdictionalDilemna, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 247, 264-65 (2000)
(listing appellate court cases). Accord Roy N. Dreben & Johanna L. Werbach, Top 10
Things to Consider in Developing an Electronic Commerce Web Site, COMPUTER LAWYER,
May 1999, at 17, 19 (stating that Internet jurisdiction 'appears to be coalescing" around
the 'seminal Zippo case").
151. Geist, supra note 124, at 1375-1381.
152. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
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district court's decision in Panavision. It is worth noting that a
commentator has argued Panavision is inconsistent with
Cybersell.153 Moreover, other courts appear to be divided on
whether to follow Panavision. This section will analyze the
controversial case.
Panavision is a
California
based company that
manufactures motion picture camera equipment. 154
In
December of 1995, Panavision sought to register a Web site on
the Internet. 155 However, the company discovered that Dennis
Toeppen had already used its trademark as the domain name for
his Web site. 156 Mr. Toeppen lived in Illinois and had registered
the name with Network Solutions, Inc (NSI). 157 NSI registers
names on a first come first served basis for a $100 registration
fee. 158 Panavision's counsel in California sent Toeppen a letter
in Illinois telling him to cease using the name. 159 Toeppen sent
a letter back to Panavision in California refusing to give up the
name unless Panavision paid him $13,000.160 After Panavision
refused, Toeppen registered Panavision's other trademark,
Panaflex, as a domain name and set up a Panaflex Web page
that said "Hello." 161 Panavision then filed suit in a California
federal court alleging that Toeppen stole domain names and
trademarks, and tried to extort money from their rightful
owners. 162 The district court found jurisdiction and the Ninth
163
Circuit affirmed.
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by discussing how
Cybersell ruled that merely advertising on a web site without
"something more" could not create jurisdiction. 164 The Ninth
Circuit further stated the Calder effects test had not been
applicable in Cybersell.165 However, the Ninth Circuit said that
the effects test had correctly been the key to the district court

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Heslinga, supra note
Toeppen, 141 F.3d at
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1318.
Id. at 1319.
Toeppen, 141 F.3d at
Id.
Toeppen, 141 F.3d at
Id.
Id. at 1318.
Id. at 1321.
Id.

150, at 261.
1319

1319.
1319.
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ruling against Toeppen. 166
Toeppen argued he had "not directed any activity toward
Panavision in California, much less 'entered' the state.... [A]ll
he did was register Panavision's trademarks on the Internet and
post Web sites using those marks; [and] if this activity injured
Panavision, the injury occurred in cyberspace." 167 The Ninth
Circuit responded by saying that "the present case is akin to a
tort case" 168 and that:
Toeppen engaged in a scheme to register Panavision's trademarks
as his domain names for the purpose of extorting money from
Panavision. His conduct, as he knew it likely would, had the effect
of injuring Panavision in California where Panavision has its
principle place of business and where the movie and television
169
industry is centered.

It is fair to say the Ninth Circuit in Panavision used the
Calder effects test, not the Zippo sliding scale. However,
Cybersell was not contradicted in the Panavision opinion. The
facts in Cybersell didn't warrant use of the effects test, unlike
the facts presented in Panavision. Thus, the commentator who
suggested the decisions were contradictory was wrong. 70 One
can still debate whether usage of the effects test was proper in
Panavisionbut there is no inconsistency with Cybersell.
3. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc. 171
a. The Case
The Ninth Circuit's most recent cyberspace jurisdiction
172
decision takes a novel approach receiving national attention.
The plaintiff, Bancroft & Masters, Inc. (B&M), is a small
California company selling computer and networking products
mainly in the San Francisco area. 173 The defendant, Augusta
National Inc. (ANI), operates the Augusta National Golf Club in

166.
167.
168.
169.

Toeppen, 141 F.3d at 1321.
Id. at 1322.
Toeppen, 141 F.3d at 1321.
Id. at 1322.

170. See supra, note 150. The William and Mary Bill of Rights Law Journal article
also incorrectly describes a Third Circuit decision as saying Cybersell and Panavision
were in conflict. Yet, the Third Circuit expressly stated otherwise. See Indus., Inc. v.
Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 264 n.7 (3d Cir. 1998).
171.
172.
173.

223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000).
Geist, supra note 124.
Bankcroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1084.
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174
Georgia where the annual Masters Tournament is held.
B&M alleged ANI sent a letter to the Internet domain name
registry's Virginia headquarters (NSI) challenging B&M's use of
the domain name, masters.com. 175 ANI also sent a letter to
B&M in California demanding B&M cease and desist using the

domain name and transfer it immediately to ANI.176 Based on

these and other actions by ANI, B&M sued ANI in the Northern
District of California seeking a declaratory judgement. 177 The
California federal court concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction
over ANI.178 However, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed
179
this finding.
The Ninth Circuit concluded there was an "express aiming"
requirement to the Calder effects test, which had to be satisfied,
namely the defendant must "have engaged in wrongful conduct
targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a
resident of the forum state." 80 After discussing several cases,
the Court stated, "The presence of individualized targeting is
what separates these cases from others in which we have found
the effects test unsatisfied."18 In Cybersell, for example, there
was no showing "the defendants even knew of the existence of
the plaintiffs, let alone targeted them individually." 8 2 In
summary, the Court ruled in Bancroft & Masters that the
defendant must have "(1) committed an intentional act, which
was (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) caused harm,
the brunt of which is suffered and which the defendant knows is
likely to be suffered in the forum state."' s3
The Ninth Circuit then analogized Bancroft to the
intentional tort scheme at issue in Panavision:
Applying these concepts to the instant case, we conclude that
B&M has demonstrated purposeful availment by ANI under the
Calder effects test. ANI acted intentionally when it sent its Letter
to NSI. The letter was expressly aimed at California because it
individually targeted B&M, a California corporation doing

174.
175.
176.
177.
dilution
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id. at 1085.
Id.
Id. (In their declaratory judgment, B & M requested the Court to find nonand non-infringement).
Bankcroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1085.
Id. at 1089.
Bankcroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1087.
Id. at 1088.
Id.
Id. at 1087.
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business almost exclusively in California. Finally, the effects of
the letter were
primarily felt, as ANI knew they would be, in
184
California.

b. Criticismsof Bancroft's Express Aiming
One problem with Bancroft's targeting approach is Calder
was an intentional tort case and Bancroft is not. The concurring
opinion showed its awareness of this problem by stating, "I
concur in the opinion only on the assumption that Augusta
National, through its letter to NSI, engaged in tortious conduct,
i.e., that they intended to effect a conversion of the masters.com
name.' 185 Yet the district court disagreed, stating, "No such
intentional scheme or tortious conduct is alleged in this
86
action."1
A further problem with Bancroft, according to a
commentator, is that it's doubtful Calder involved a publication
intending to injure Shirley Jones. Presumably, the Enquirer
instead sought to attract readers. 87 Thus, the majority's
requirement in Bancroft, that the defendant intend to harm the
plaintiff in the forum state, need not be read so strictly. It
should be enough that the defendant has knowledge a tortious
effect is likely to occur, not that the defendant intended the
tortious effect for a specific state.
This same commentator argues Bancroft was wrong, even
under a more liberal effects test. He suggests:
The result of the majority opinion seems unfair because while
Bancroft had agreed to NSI's dispute resolution procedure
concerning the "masters.com" domain name, Augusta had not.
Subjecting a defendant to personal jurisdiction in the forum state
on the basis of contractual
relations between the plaintiff and a
88
third party is unjust.'

Yet this powerful objection does not undermine the
targeting legal principles. The objection says they were
misapplied.
184. Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1087.
185. Id. at 1089.
186. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l., Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 777, 782 (Cal.
1998). The district court also ruled, "The intellectual property dispute underlying the
instant complaint does not 'arise out of ANI's letter to Network Solutions, Inc.", thus
failing another prong of the specific jurisdiction test. Id.
187. Christopher Allen Kroblin, Note, Expanding the Jurisdictional Reach for
Intentional Torts: Implications for Cyber Contacts, 31 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 51, 87
n.251 (2001).
188. Kroblin, supra note 187, at 87.
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c. The Benefits and Unanswered Questions Regarding Targeting
Professor Michael Geist has said Bancroft's "express
aiming" or "targeting" focus is a superior approach to cyberspace
jurisdiction questions because it avoids the weaknesses of Zippo.
He says:
Unlike the Zippo approach, a targeting analysis would seek to
identify the intentions of the parties and to assess the steps taken
to either enter or to avoid a particular jurisdiction. Targeting
would also lessen reliance on effects-based analysis, the source of
considerable uncertainty since Internet-based activity 8 9can
ordinarily be said to create some effects in most jurisdictions.1

Professor Geist then elaborates on what aspects of the
targeting test need to be fleshed out, after showing how it's
increasingly being advocated by courts and commentators. His
discussion has special power after seeing the misapplication of
the test in Bancroft:
To identify the appropriate criteria for a targeting test, we must
ultimately return to the core jurisdictional principle foreseeability. Foreseeability should not be based on a passive
versus active Web site matrix, however. Rather, an effective
targeting test requires an assessment of whether the targeting of a
specific jurisdiction was itself foreseeable. Foreseeability in that
context depends on three factors - contracts, technology, and
actual or implied knowledge. Forum selection clauses found in
Web site terms of use agreements or transactional clickwrap
agreements allow parties to mutually determine an appropriate
jurisdiction in advance of a dispute .... Newly-emerging
technologies that identify geographic location constitute the
second factor. These technologies, which challenge widely held
perceptions about the Internet's architecture, may allow sites to
target their content by engaging in "jurisdictional avoidance." The
third factor, actual or implied knowledge, is a catch-all that
incorporates targeting knowledge gained through the geographic
location of tort victims, offline order fulfillment, financial
intermediary records, and Web traffic. 190

Professor Geist concludes, "[tihe move toward using contract
and technology to erect virtual borders may not answer the
question of whether there is a there there, but at least it will go
a long way in determining where the there might be."191 The
American Bar Association in a recent study reported favorably

189. Michael Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet
Jurisdiction,661 PRAC. L. INST. PAT. 561, 598 (July 2001).
190. Geist, supranote 189, at 602-03.
191. Id. at 624.
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on the targeting approach as well. 192 Thus, this seems to be the
cutting edge of cyberspace jurisdiction theory.
C. The Montana Cases
1. The Cases
The leading Montana Supreme Court decision regarding
cyberspace personal jurisdiction is Bedrejo v. Triple E Canada,
Ltd.193 The case involved a Canadian manufacturer of a motor
194
home that crashed while being driven near Dillon, Montana.
The driver and passengers were foreigners and were all either
killed or injured. 195 Concerning jurisdiction, plaintiffs argued
Triple E had a Web site accessible in Montana, advertised in
national magazines, ran an "Adventure Club" to plan trips
through the U.S. and Canada, and owned out-of-state
dealerships providing sales coverage for at least three
Montanans. 96 Triple E responded, however, that the company
was not registered with the Montana Secretary of State, and
that the company did not have an office, a phone listing, any
employees or any dealers in Montana. 97 The motor home also
198
was purchased outside of Montana.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
decision finding Montana lacked personal jurisdiction. 199 The
Court said the plaintiff made no clear allegations the claims
arose out of or were related to Triple E's contacts with the forum
state. 20 0 Thus, specific jurisdiction was lacking.
The Court further determined Triple E's Web site did not
establish jurisdiction. 20 1
The Court relied on Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King and another non-Montana case,

192.
GLOBAL CYBERSPACE JURISDICTION PROJECT, AM. BAR ASS'N, A REPORT ON
GLOBAL JURISDICTION ISSUES CREATED BY THE INTERNET 28-30 (London Meeting 2000),

availableat http://www.abanet.org?buslaw/cyber/initiatives/draft.rtf.
193.
1999 MT 200, 295 Mont. 430, 984 P.2d 739.
194. Bedrejo, 1999 MT 200, 3.
195. Id. at % 3-4.
196. Id. at 8.
197. Id. at 1 11.
198. Bedrejo, 1999 MT 200, %11.
199. Id. at 21.
200. Id. at % 15. Specifically, the Court stated "Nothing was presented to connect
the victims or the driver of the motor home with any of these 'contacts' between Montana
and Triple E." Id.
201. Id. at
17-20.
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Millennium EnterprisesInc. v. Millennium Music, LP.20 2 There,
an Oregon federal court held an interactive Web site did not
expose its owner to liability in Oregon unless it could be shown
that Oregon residents actually consummated transactions
through the site in sufficient numbers.2 03
Similarly, the
Montana Supreme Court concluded Bedrejo by stating, "We
agree -with the District Court that any 'entry' by Triple E into
Montana amounted to only an 'insignificant trickle' in the
stream of commerce, and we hold that the exercise of
20 4
jurisdiction over Triple E would not be reasonable."
Apart from Bedrejo, The Montana Supreme Court briefly
touched on the issue of cyberspace personal jurisdiction in
Threlkeld v. Colorado.20 5
In Threlkeld, the Court cited
approvingly to Bedrejo in its discussion about why general
jurisdiction was absent. 20 6 Threlkeld involved a lawsuit by some
Montanans alleging veterinary malpractice against Colorado
State University.20 7 The Court said there was nothing to
indicate that CSU's Web site "is anything more than a medium
for the dissemination of information to Internet users."208 Thus,
CSU could not be subject to personal jurisdiction based on the
Web site. 209 Interestingly, the Montana Supreme Court in
Threlkeld did not discuss Bedrejo when determining specific
jurisdiction was lacking over CSU.
2. Assessing Bedrejo
Bedrejo suggests the Montana Supreme Court is hesitant to
expose out-of-staters to jurisdiction in Montana based solely on
Web sites. For example, Professor Geist cites Millennium
Enterprisesas one of the leading cases critical of the supposedly
amorphous Zippo test.210 Geist also approvingly cites Bensusan
211
as a case protecting Internet business activity.
202. Id. at 20; see Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) and Millennium, 33
F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. Or. 1999).
203. Millennium, 33 F. Supp. at 921. This analysis is troubling because the number
of hits in the state doesn't determine whether the Web site owner purposefully availed
himself of the chance to do business there or not.
204. Bedrejo, 1999 MT 200, 1 21.
205. 2000 MT 369, 303 Mont. 432, 16 P.3d 359.
206. Id. at 16.
207. Id. at IT 3- 4.
208. Id. at 17.
209. Id.
210. Geist, supra note 124, at 1376.
211. Id. at 1365.
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On the other hand, Bedrejo may only have limited
precedential value since the Court was distracted by the Web
jurisdiction issue and engaged in a flawed specific jurisdiction
analysis. Courts are frequently distracted from applying normal
legal principles in cyberspace cases. 212 How was the Court's
ruling in Bedrejo flawed and distracted?
First, the Supreme Court ignored several Montana federal
district court decisions holding that a defendant who commits a
tort in Montana is subject to personal jurisdiction in a lawsuit
arising out of or related to that tort. For example, in Great
Plains Crop Mgmt. Inc. v. Tryco Mfg. Co., 213 the Court stated:
a manufacturer should be expected to defend its products
whenever they go, when that manufacturer intends distribution
beyond a purely local level. [Scanlan v. Normal Projektil Fabrik;
Yules v. General Motors Corp.] While Scanlan was a Rule 4B(1)(b)
"tort accrual" case, the same principle applies here: a party
seeking the advantages of a broader marketing area must be
expected to follow those products. The defendant knew its
products were going to Montana. It should also have known that
214
problems could develop.

Yules v. General Motors Corporation even involved an auto
crash where the court rejected the car manufacturer's motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 215 While the Montana
Supreme Court is not bound by these federal court rulings,
failing to discuss them is bad form.
Second, the Montana Supreme Court also never mentions
the most analogous U.S. Supreme Court case on personal
jurisdiction, namely World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson.216 The
Court there analyzed whether Oklahoma had personal
jurisdiction over a New York area car dealer that sold a car
which subsequently exploded in Oklahoma. 217 The Court found
the New York dealer had not purposefully availed itself of the
chance to do business outside the tri-state area where it made

212. See Mark S. Kende, Lost in Cyberspace: the Judiciary'sDistractedApplication
of Free Speech and Personal JurisdictionDoctrines to the Internet, 77 OR. L. REV. 1125
(Winter 1998).
213. 554 F. Supp. 1025 (D. Mont. 1983).
214. Great Plains, 554 F. Supp. at 1028 (citations omitted). The Court cited
Scanlan v. Normal Projektil Fabrik, 345 F.Supp. 292, 293 (D. Mont. 1972) and Yules v.
GeneralMotors Corp., 297 F. Supp. 674 (D. Mont. 1969).
215. See also Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1172 (5th Cir.
1985).
216. 444 U.S. 286, 287.
217. Id. at 288.
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most of its sales. 218 The Court, however, kept the German car
manufacturer in the case because of its global sales and
marketing efforts. 219 Similarly, there's at least some evidence in
the Bedrejo record suggesting Triple E marketed and serviced
220
its motor homes throughout the United States.
Third, the Court in Bedrejo also mistakenly insisted the
lawsuit didn't arise out of the Triple E Web page, or any of
Triple E's other contacts. However, the lawsuit obviously arose
out of Triple E's most significant contact with the state: the
motor home's presence there. Indeed, the Triple E Web site
should almost be irrelevant to the analysis given this crucial
connection.
In conclusion, though Bedrejo suggests the Montana
Supreme Court will not find personal jurisdiction to exist based
solely on a Web site, the decision is not the most convincing
precedent. 22' The Court seems to adopt a Zippo sliding scale
test with the added requirement that the lawsuit must arise
directly out of any Web site interactivity with the forum state.
The problem is the case seems inconsistent with U.S. Supreme
Court precedents like World Wide Volkswagen, even without
regard to the Internet issue. Perhaps this is why the Montana
Supreme Court in Threlkeld conducted its specific jurisdiction
analysis without mentioning Bedrejo.
D. Recommendations
The above analysis above shows the great uncertainty
existing over cyberspace personal jurisdiction. What advice then
should clients receive to limit liability? The following is a list of
suggestions I told attorneys in a recent Continuing Legal
Education program:
1) Advise your clients about the risks of having a highly
interactive Web site shown by Zippo and the cases just discussed.
2) Advise your clients to be careful about posting messages on
their Web sites directed at attracting customers from any
particular state or locale. Such messages give customers in those
locations the ability to argue your client targeted that jurisdiction.

218. Id. at 295.
219. World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 314.
220. See Bedrejo, 1999 MT 200, 8.
221. The decision is also internally contradictory. The Court quoted plaintiffs
complaint as saying magazine ads were distributed in Montana, but later says there was
no proof that the magazines were available in Montana. Bedrejo, 1999 MT 200,
8,
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3) Recommend to your clients they insert "choice of forum" and
"choice of law" clauses into Web site order forms. The clauses
should also be highlighted to weaken adhesion contract objections.
4) Recommend to your clients they determine how much business
their Web site generates per state. Based on this information, you
can provide information about whether those states have broad or
narrow approaches towards cyberspace jurisdiction. For example,
the Northern District of Illinois seems to have
a broad approach,
222
unlike the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
5) Recommend to your clients any Internet message they post or
send should contain a disclaimer saying it is only intended to be
read by viewers in those states where the message is legal.
6) Remind your clients the substantive law may be different in
the states where they do business via the Web as compared to
Montana's substantive law. They may, therefore, have to change
their behavior to avoid liability.
7) Advise your clients to be careful about what they advertise so
they can't be subject to fraud or deceptive advertising claims.
8) Advise your clients to be careful about what hypertext links
they provide. The links may include defamatory or fraudulent
material and your clients could be held responsible.
9) Remind your clients to be careful about allowing employees or
anybody else to post information on the Web sites so as to avoid
possible liability.
10) Advise your clients to comply with any privacy requirements
in the jurisdictions where their Web site can be accessed. This
means they may need to be cautious about what tracking they do
(see recommendation #4 above).
11) Advise your clients about the importance of keeping the Web
site current and keeping informed regarding new cyberspace legal
and technological developments. For example, new geographic
technologies may enable Web sites to block access
in certain
223
forums where the site content may be problematic.

CONCLUSION
Cyberspace has raised numerous interesting problems as
courts struggle to apply old doctrines to dynamic technology.
Though this process will take a while, cyberspace will ultimately
test the doctrines, revealing which make sense and which
deserve substantial modification. To that extent, cyberspace, in
222. There is, however, a downside to this recommendation. Tracking would
prevent your client from claiming ignorance about where it was doing Web business,
thus weakening its argument against purposefil availment. Nonetheless, I think such
ignorance is not usually persuasive to courts.
223. Geist, supra note 124, at 1385.
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the long run, will benefit the courts and those who take
advantage of all it has to offer.
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